Networked systems are ubiquitous in today's world with examples spanning from ecology to the social and engineering sciences. Much of the research in networked systems is analytical, where the focus is on characterizing (and potentially influencing) the emergent collective behavior, e.g., predicting the distribution of animals and humans in a given ecological system. A more recent trend of research focuses on the design of networked systems capable of achieving diverse and highly coordinated collective behavior in the absence of centralized control, e.g., designing a team of unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the perimeter of a wild fire. Unfortunately, our understanding of how microscopic behavior impacts the macroscopic phenomena in network systems is inadequate for meeting the demands of this emerging design task. This paper focuses on an instance of this design task for a well-studied class of coverage problems where the goal is to allocate a collection of agents to a subset of resources in order to maximize the cumulative value of the covered resources. Our first result demonstrates that any agent-based algorithm relying solely on local information induces a fundamental trade-off between the best and worst case performance guarantees, as measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability. This result highlights how the information available to the agents translates to constraints on the achievable efficiency guarantees in networked control systems. Our second results demonstrates how to use an additional piece of system-level information to breach these limitations, thereby improving the system's performance.
Introduction
A multiagent system can be characterized by a collection of individual subsystems, each making independent decisions in response to locally available information. Such a decision-making architecture can either emerge naturally as the results of self-interested behavior, e.g., drivers in a transportation network, or be the result of a design choice in engineered system. In the latter case, the need for distributed decision-making stems from the scale, spatial distribution, and sheer quantity of information associated with various problem domains that exclude the possibility for centralized decision making and control. One concrete example is the problem of monitoring the perimeter of a wild fire, where the goal is to deploy a collection of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to effectively survey the perimeter of a wild fire under the operational constraint that each UAV makes independent surveillance decisions in response to local information regarding its own aerial view of the landscape and minimal information regarding the state of neighboring UAVs [1] . Alternative examples include the use of robotic networks in post-disaster environments [20, 16] , task scheduling and management [8] , water conservative food production [18] , fleets of autonomous vehicles [33] , micro-scale medical treatments [32, 15] , among others.
Regardless of the specific problem domain, the central goal in the design of a networked control system is to derive admissible control policies for the decision-making entities that ensure the emergent collective behavior is desirable with regards to a given system-level objective. At a high level, this design process entails specifying two key elements: the information available to each subsystem, attained either through sensing or communication, and a decision-making mechanism that prescribes how each subsystem processes available information to take decisions. The quality of a networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimensions including the stability and efficacy of the emergent collective behavior, characteristics of the transient behavior, in addition to communication costs associated with propagating information throughout the system. The focus of this paper is on the following two questions associated with the design of networked control systems.
(i) What are the decision-making rules that optimize the performance of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of informational availability?
(ii) What is the value of information in networked control architectures? That is, how does informational availability translate to attainable performance guarantees for the emergent behavior through the design of appropriate decision-making mechanisms?
This paper seeks to shed light on the answer to these two questions in a class of multiagent set covering problems introduced in [13] . In a multiagent set covering problem we are given a ground set of resources, and n collections of subsets of the ground set. Every resource is associated with a respective value or worth. The system-level objective is to select one set from each collection so as to maximize the total value of covered elements.
If the n collections of subsets coincide (i.e. if we reduce to the max-n-coverage problem, [30] ), there are well-established centralized algorithms that can derive an admissible allocation of agents to resources that is within a factor of 1 − 1/e of the optimal allocation's value in polynomial time [31, 30, 11, 19] . No polynomial time algorithm can provide a better approximation, unless P = N P. Unfortunately, the applicability of such centralized algorithms for the control of multiagent systems is limited given the concerns highlighted above. Hence, in this paper we consider distributed approaches for reaching a near-optimal allocation where the individual agents make their covering selections in response to locally available information accordingly to a designed decision-making policy. The central goal here is to design agent decision-making rules that optimize the quality of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of informational availability. Of specific interest will be identifying how the level of information available to the individual agents impacts the attainable performance guarantees associated with the designed networked control system.
In the spirit of [13, 26] , we approach this problem through a game theoretic lens where we model the individual agents as players in a game and each agent is associated with a local objective function that guides its decision-making process. We treat these local objective functions as our design parameter and focus our analysis on characterizing the performance guarantees associated with the resulting equilibria of the designed game. The justification for focusing purely on equilibria, derives from the fact that there is a rich body of literature in distributed learning that could be coupled with the derived objective functions to attain distributed algorithms that lead the collective behavior to an equilibrium, c.f., [12, 3] . We concentrate our analysis on two well-studied performance metrics in the game theoretic literature termed the price of anarchy and price of stability [2, 17] . Informally, the price of anarchy provides performance guarantees associated with the worst performing equilibrium relative to the optimal allocation. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best performing equilibrium. The lack of uniqueness of equilibria implies that these bounds are often quite different.
The work of [13] was one of the first to view price of anarchy as a design objective rather than its more traditional counterpart as an analytical tool. The main results in [13] identify a set of agent objective functions that optimize the price of anarchy when agents are only aware of (i) the resources the agent can select and (ii) the number of agents covering these resources. Note that in this setting, any agent i is unaware of the covering options of any other agents j = i, as well as any resource values that the agent is unable to cover. Interestingly, [13] demonstrate that this optimal price of anarchy attains the same 1 − 1/e guarantees of the best centralized algorithms (even when the n collections of subsets are different), meaning that there is no degradation in terms of the worst-case efficiency guarantees when transitioning from the best centralized algorithm to the presented distributed algorithm that adheres to the prescribed informational limitations.
Our Contribution. A networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimensions, and worst-case metrics, such as the price of anarchy, are obviously one of these dimensions. The first main question we address in this manuscript is whether utilizing the agent objective functions that optimize the price of anarchy has any unintended consequences with regards to other performance metrics of interest. The response is in the affirmative, as detailed in our first main theorem.
-In Theorem 1, we demonstrate that there is a fundamental trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability in such multiagent covering problems. That is, designing agent objective functions to improve the price of anarchy necessarily degrades the price of stability. As corner cases, any objective functions that ensure a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e also inherit a price of stability of 1 − 1/e. Note that having a price of stability < 1 implies that the optimal allocation is not necessarily an equilibrium. Alternatively, any objective functions that ensure a price of stability of 1 also inherit a price of anarchy of at most 1/2. This theorem characterizes the price of anarchy and price of stability frontier that is achievable through the design of agent objective functions in these multiagent covering problem.
The second main result of this manuscript focuses on the impact of information on the performance guarantees associated with the optimal agent objective functions that exploit the underlying informational availability. Theorem 1 demonstrates that there is a price of anarchy and price of stability frontier when agents are only aware of (i) the resources the agent can select and (ii) the number of agents covering these resources. The following theorem demonstrates that one can move beyond this frontier by providing the agents with additional information about the system at large.
-In Theorem 5, we identify a minimal (and easily attainable) piece of system-level information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with performance guarantees beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier provided in Theorem 1. When agents are provided with this additional information, which can be vaguely interpreted as the largest value of an uncovered resource in the system, one can derive agent objective function that yield a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e and a price of stability of 1, which was unattainable without this additional piece of information.
It is important to stress that the specific make-up of this information is not necessarily important; rather, the importance of this result centers on the fact that certain attributes of the system can be exploited in networked architectures if those attributes are propagated to the agents. Minimizing the amount of information that needs to be propagated throughout the system to move beyond the frontier is clearly an important question that warrants future attention. Lastly, to highlight the significance of Theorem 5, it is important to highlight that even setting agents objective functions as the system-level objective is not sufficient to overcome the frontier established in Theorem 1.
Related Work. The results contained in this manuscript add to the growing literature of utility design, which can be interpreted as a subfield of mechanism design [7] where the objective is to design admissible agent objective functions to optimize various performance metrics, such as the price of anarchy and price of stability, [21, 27, 5] . While recent work in [14] has identified all design approaches that ensure equilibrium existence in local utility designs, in general the question of optimizing the efficiency of the resulting equilibria, i.e., optimizing the price of anarchy, is far less understood. Nonetheless, there are a few positive results in this domain worth reviewing. Beyond [13] , alternative problem domains where optimizing the price of anarchy has been explored include concave cost sharing games [24] , reverse carpooling games [23] , among others. The bulk of the research regarding optimal utility design has concentrated on a specific class of objectives, termed budget-balanced objectives, which imposes the constraint that the sum of the agents' objectives is equal to the system welfare for every allocation. Within the confines of budget-balanced agent objective functions, several works have identified the optimality of the Shapley value objective design with regards to the price of anarchy guarantees [9, 10, 6] . However, the imposition of this budget-balanced constraint is unwarranted in the context of multiagent system design and its removal allows for improved performance, as shown in [13] and in this manuscript.
Organization. In section 2 we introduce the multiagent coverage problem and corresponding performance metrics. In section 3 we present the trade-off between price of anarchy and stability.
In section 4 we show how to breach this trade-off by leveraging an additional piece of system-level information.
Notation. We use N, R >0 and R ≥0 to denote the set of natural, positive and non negative real numbers; e is Euler's number.
Model and Performance Metrics
In this section we introduce the multiagent set covering problem and our game theoretic model for the design of local decision-making mechanisms [13] . Further, we define the objectives and performance metrics of interest, as well as provide a review of the relevant literature.
Covering problems
Let R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be a finite set of resources where each resource r ∈ R is associated with a value v r ≥ 0 defining its importance. We consider a covering problem where the goal is to allocate a collection of agents N = {1, . . . , n} to resources in R in order to maximize the cumulative value of the covered resources. The set of possible assignments for each agent i ∈ N is given by A i ⊆ R and we express an allocation by the tuple a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A n . The total value, or welfare, associated with an allocation a is given by
The goal of the covering problem is to find an optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation a opt ∈ A such that W (a opt ) ≥ W (a) for all a ∈ A.We will express an allocation a as (a i , a −i ) with the understanding that a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the collection of choices of the agents other than agent i.
A game theoretic model
This paper focuses on deriving distributed mechanisms for attaining near optimal solutions to covering problem where the individual agents make independent covering choices in response to local available information. Specifically, in this section we assume that each agent i has information only regarding the resources that the agent can select, i.e., the resources A i ⊆ R.
Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process, here we focus on the design of local agent objective functions that adhere to these informational dependencies and will ultimately be used to guide the agents' selection process. To that end, we consider the framework of distributed welfare games [26] where each agent is associated with a local utility or objective function U i : A → R and for any allocation a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ A, the utility of agent i is
where |a| r captures the number of agents that choose resource r in the allocation a, i.e. the cardinality of the set {i ∈ N : a i = r}, and f : N → R defines the fractional benefit awarded to each agent for selecting a given resource in allocation a. We will refer to f as the distribution rule throughout. Note that an agent's utility function in (1) is consistent with the local information available as it only depends on the resource that the agent selected, the number of agents that also selected this resource, as well as the distribution rule f and relevant resource value v r 4 . We will express such a welfare sharing game by the tuple G = {N, R, {A i } i∈N , f, {v r } r∈R } and drop the subscripts on the above sets, e.g., denote {v r } r∈R as simply {v r }, for brevity.
The goal of this paper is to derive the distribution rule f that optimizes the performance of the emergent collective behavior. Here, we focus on the concept of pure Nash equilibrium as a model for this emergent collective behavior [29] . A pure Nash equilibrium, which we will henceforth refer to as just an equilibrium, is defined as an allocation a ne ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N and for all a i ∈ A i , we have
. In essence, an equilibrium represents an allocation for which no single agent has a unilateral incentive to alter its covering choice given the choices of the other agents. It is important to highlight that an equilibrium might not exist in a general game G. Nevertheless, when restricting attention to the class of games with utility functions defined in (1), an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as the resulting game is known to be a congestion game [28] . 5 We will measure the efficiency of an equilibrium allocation in a game G through two commonly studied measures, termed price of anarchy and price of stability, defined as follows:
where we use the notation a ne ∈ G to imply an equilibrium of the game G. In words, the price of anarchy characterizes the performance of the worst equilibrium of G relative to the performance of the optimal allocation, while the price of stability focuses on the best equilibrium in the game G. Such distinction is required as equilibria are guaranteed to exists for the class of utilities considered in (1), but in general they are not unique. By definition 0 ≤ PoA(G) ≤ PoS(G) ≤ 1. Throughout, we require that a system designer commits to a distribution rule without explicit knowledge of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. Note that once a particular distribution rule f has been chosen, this distribution rule defines a game for any realization of the parameters. The objective of the system designer is to provide desirable performance guarantees irrespective of the realization of these parameter, even if they where chosen by an adversary. To that end, let G f denote the family of games induced by a given distribution rule f , i.e., any game G ∈ G f is of the above form. We will measure the quality of a distribution rule f by a worst-case analysis over the set of induced games G f , which is the natural extension of the price of anarchy and price of stability defined above, i.e.,
PoS
The price of anarchy PoA(G f ) for a given distribution rule f provides a bound on the quality of any equilibrium irrespective of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best equilibrium. 6 The goal of this paper is to investigate the design of distribution rules that optimize the metrics introduced in (2) and (3). A natural question is whether the locality requirement specified in the agents' utility functions in (1) is detrimental from a performance perspective. To address this question, suppose that a system designer was able to directly set each agent's utility function as the global welfare, i.e., U i (a) = W (a), which clearly violates our locality condition. It is fairly straightforward to show that the price of anarchy associated with this design choice is 0.5. As we will see in the ensuing section, there are alternative utility designs conforming to (1) that guarantee a better price of anarchy than 0.5. Hence, while setting U i (a) = W (a) might seem a natural choice to optimize the price of anarchy, there are alternative choices that are local and yield far better results.
The Trade-off Between the Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy
In this section we provide our first main result that characterizes the inherent tension between the price of anarchy and price of stability as design objectives in multiagent covering problems.
Recall that G f is the set of set covering games induced by a given distribution rule f . We now introduce a subset of these games that impose constraints on the maximum number of agents that could select a single resource. More formally, let G k f ⊆ G f , k ≥ 1, denote the family of games where at most k agents can select any single resource, i.e.
We will refer to the games G k f as games with cardinality k. 
(iii) The bounds given in Cases (i) and (ii) are tight.
The results of Theorem 1 are illustrated in Figure 1 . In particular, Theorem 1-(ii) establishes that there does not exist a distribution rule f that attains a price of stability and price of anarchy in the red region of the figure. Hence, there is an inherent tension between these two measures of efficiency as improving the performance of the worst equilibria necessarily comes at the expense of the best equilibria, and vice versa. The expression of Z k (α) defines this tradeoff. Theorem 1-(iii) guarantees that the bounds obtained in Cases (i) and (ii) are tight, i.e., there are distribution rules that achieve a price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees that lie exactly on the boundary of the red region. Note that Z k (α) is non-increasing in α and lim k→∞ Z k (1 − 1/e) = 1 − 1/e. 
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the red region is also not achievable. That is, there does not exist a distribution rule with joint price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees in the red region. For example, if α ≤ 1/2, then a price of stability of 1 is attainable while meeting this price of anarchy demand. However, if α = 1 − 1/e, then a price of stability of 1 is no longer attainable. In fact, the best attainable price of stability is now also 1 − 1/e.
Supporting Results
Before delving into the proof of Theorem 1, we present two supporting results which will be essential for the forthcoming proof.
We begin our analysis by strengthening the results in [13] to attain a tight price of anarchy for any distribution rule f .
Our first result strengthens the findings of [13] to obtain a tight price of anarchy for any distribution rule f over each set of games G k f , where k ≥ 1.
Theorem 2. Consider any non-increasing distribution rule f and cardinality k ≥ 1. The price of anarchy associated with the induced family of games G k f is
Further, the unique distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy over the induced games
The proof can be found in the Appendix. We now shift our attention to the other performance metric of interest, the price of stability. Our next theorem provides a tight characterization of the price of stability for any non-increasing distribution rule f . 
.
The optimal price of stability is max f PoS(G k f ) = 1, and the unique distribution rule that achieves this price of stability over the induced games G k f is the marginal contribution distribution rule f mc given by
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the unique distribution rule f k gar optimizing the price of anarchy in Theorem 2 and the unique distribution rule f mc that optimizes the price of stability given in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 1
We will now shift our attention to the proof of Theorem 1. First, observe that χ k f defined in (6) can be equivalently characterized as the solution to the the following optimization problem
This allows us to state the following corollary, which will be useful to prove Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let F k α , α ∈ (0, 1), denote the family of distribution rules that guarantee a price of anarchy of at least α in games with cardinality k ≥ 1, i.e.,
Then, the set F k α is uniquely defined by the set of distribution rules f that satisfy the following k-linear equations,
Finally, let us define
as the best achievable price of stability given that the price of anarchy is guaranteed to exceed α, where α ∈ (0, 1). We will now state an enriched version of Theorem 1 using the notation just introduced, as this allows for a more precise proof. ii) For any α satisfying 1 2 
and lim k→∞ PoS(G k ; α) = 1 − 1 e . Proof. i) Consider the marginal contribution distribution rule f mc , defined in (9) . It is straightforward to verify that χ k fmc = 1 and hence f mc ∈ F k α for any α ≤ 1/2. Further, it is well-known that PoS(G k fmc ) = 1, see [27] . This completes the first part of the proof. ii) We shift our attention to the price of stability. From Theorem 3 and (10) we have
The optimization problem in (13) is equivalent to
We find an optimal solution by first solving for the distribution rule that satisfies the k − 1 linear inequalities with equality, followed by verifying that the resulting distribution rule is non increasing. Such distribution rule can be computed recursively, and is of the form
Using Theorem 3 on such distribution rule, gives the desired result in (11) .
iii) The final result can be proven as follows: replace α in (11) with the optimal price of anarchy from [13, Corollary 1], i.e., set
After some manipulation,
proving the claim in (12) . Taking the limit k → ∞ in the previous expression, gives the final result.
The previous section highlights a fundamental tension between the price of stability and price of anarchy for the given covering problem when restricted to local agent objective functions of the form (1) . In this section, we challenge the role of locality in these fundamental trade-offs. That is, we show how to move beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier given in Theorem 1 if we allow the agents to condition their choice on a higher degree of system-level information.
With this goal in mind, we introduce a minimal and easily attainable piece of system-level information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with efficiency guarantees beyond this frontier. To that end, for each allocation a ∈ A we define the information flow graph (V, E) where each node of the graph represents an agent and we construct a directed edge i → j if a i ∈ A j for i = j (no self loops). Based on this allocation-dependent graph, we define for each agent i the set N i (a) ⊆ N consisting of all the agents that can reach i through a path in the graph (V, E). Similarly, for each agent i we define
which consists of the union of A i and all the sets of other agents that can reach i through a path in the graph. An example is shown in Figure 3 . Building upon this graph we define the following quantities:
x i (a) = max
The term V i (a) captures the highest valued resource in agent i's choice set A i that is not covered by any agent. If the set A i \ a −i is empty, we set V i (a) = 0. Similarly, the term x i (a) captures the highest-valued resource in the enlarged set Q i (a) not currently covered by any other agent. If the set Q i (a) \ a is empty, we set x i (a) = 0.
We are now ready to specify the information based game. As before, we have a set of agents N and each agent has an action set A i ⊆ R. Here, we consider a state-based distribution rule that toggles between the two extreme optimal distribution rules: Gairing's rule and the marginal contribution rule. More formally, the distribution rule for agent i is now of the form
and the corresponding utilities are given by U i (a i = r, a −i ) = v r · f k i (a), as we allow the systemlevel information x i (a) and V i (a) to prescribe which distribution rule each agent applies. We denote with f k sb = {f k i } i∈N the collection of distribution rules in (17) and informally refer to it as to the state-based distribution rule. 7 The next theorem demonstrates how f k sb attains performance guarantees beyond the price of stability / price of anarchy frontier established in Theorem 1. 
The proof is postponed to the Appendix. We remark on Theorem 5 for the case when k → ∞ for ease of exposition. Note that for this case, a consequence of attaining a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e was a price of stability also of 1 − 1/e and this was achieved by f gar defined in (7) . Using the state-based rule given in (17), a system designer can achieve the optimal price of anarchy without any consequences for the price of stability. Hence, the identified piece of system-level information was crucial for moving beyond the inherited performance limitations by adhering to our notion of local information. Whether alternative forms of system-level information could move us beyond these guarantees, or achieve these guarantees with less information, is an open research question.
Conclusions
How should a system operator design a networked architecture? The answer to this question is non-trivial and involves weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with different design choices. In this paper we highlight one novel trade-off pertaining to the price of anarchy and price of stability in set covering problems with local information. Further, we demonstrate how a system designer can move beyond these limitations by equipping the agents with additional information about the system. Fully realizing the potential of multiagent systems requires to pursue a more formal understanding of the inherent limitations and performance trade-offs associated with networked architectures. While this paper focused purely on two performance measures, other metrics of interest include convergence rates, robustness to adversaries, fairness, among others. In each of these settings, it is imperative that a system operator fully understands the role of information within these trade-offs. Only then, will a system operator be able to effectively balance the potential performance gains with the communication costs associated with propagating additional information through the system.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2
The distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy and the corresponding optimal value are derived in [13] by means of a different approach. Thus, in the following we only show the tight bound of (5).
Proof. For any non increasing distribution rule, [13] proves that the price of anarchy satisfies
holds too, which will complete the proof.
To do so, note that by definition
Hence, we can distinguish two cases. For each of them we will construct an instance of covering game that achieves PoA(G k f ) = 1 1+χ k f , thus completing the proof.
First, suppose f (j) > f (j + 1) and define γ = f (j + 1)/f (j) < 1. Consider the instance given in Figure 4 , where there are j agents at each of the m + 1 levels (m > 0). Each agent Fig. 4 : First instance used in case i).
is represented by a solid line and the circles at either end of the line indicate the choices available to that agent. In particular, in Level 0 there are j agents and j + 1 resources of which j valued at γ 0 f (j) and a single one valued at γ 0 . At each subsequent level k > 0, there are j agents and j resources of which j − 1 valued at γ k f (j) and a single one valued at γ k . Further, at each level k > 0 one of the agents can choose between the common element at level k or the common at level k − 1. The equilibrium allocation a ne consists of all the agents selecting the common resource to their right in Figure 4 . This produces a welfare of W (a ne ) = 1 + γ + · · · + γ m = 1−γ m+1 1−γ , which in the limit of m → ∞ reduces to
The optimal allocation a opt covers all resources, except one of those valued γ m f (j), yielding a total welfare of W (a opt ) = W (a ne ) + W (a ne )(j − 1)f (j) + f (j)(1 − γ m ), which in the limit of m → ∞ reduces to
from which the desired result follows:
Now, suppose f (j) = f (j + 1). Consider the instance given in Figure 5 , consisting of j agents and j + 1 resources, one of them valued at 1 and j − 1 valued at f (j). One equilibrium allocation a ne consists of all the agents selecting the resource to their right, producing a welfare of W (a ne ) = 1. On the other hand, the optimum yields W (a opt ) = (j − 1)f (j) ii) χ k f = (k − 1)f (k). The second instance discussed in the previous case applies here as well, with j = k. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
The distribution rule maximizing the price of stability and the corresponding optimal value are trivial to obtain, once the result in (8) is proven. Before proceeding with showing the latter, we observe that we can restrict our attention to games G ∈ G k f where there is an optimal allocation that is disjoint, i.e., there is an optimal allocation a opt such that a opt i = a opt j for any i = j. The following claim, stated without proof, formalizes this observation.
Claim. LetḠ k f ⊆ G k f be the set of games where each game G ∈Ḡ k f has an optimal allocation that is disjoint. The price of stability and price of anarchy satisfy
Throughout the remainder of the proof, we will concentrate on games that possess an optimal allocation that is disjoint. We will continue to denote the game set as G k f as opposed toḠ k f for ease of presentation.
We will prove the above price of stability result through a series of intermediate claims.
A central piece of the forthcoming analysis is the focus on a particular sequence of allocations a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m derived from a series of unilateral deviations of players switching from their choice in the equilibrium allocation to their choice in the optimal allocation. We begin by observing that any game G in the class G k f is a congestion game, and thus is a potential game as introduced in [28] , with a potential function φ :
It is well-known that an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any potential game [28] , and one such equilibrium is the allocation that optimizes the potential function φ, i.e., a ne ∈ arg max a∈A φ(a). Focusing on this specific equilibrium, we consider a sequence of allocations taking the form a 0 = a ne and a k = (a opt i(k) , a k−1 −i(k) ) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m} where i(k) is the deviating player in the k-th profile. The selection of the deviating players I = {i(1), . . . , i(m)} is chosen according to the following rules:
(i) Let i(1) ∈ N be any arbitrary player.
(ii) For each k ≥ 1, if a opt i(k) = a ne i (1) or a opt i(k) / ∈ a ne then the sequence is terminated. (iii) Otherwise, let i(k + 1) be any agent in the set {j ∈ N : a k j = a opt i(k) } and repeat.
Proof. We begin with two observations on the above sequence of allocations: (a) the sequence of allocations can continue at most n steps due to the disjointness of a opt and (b) if the sequence continues, it must be that for player i(k + 1) a ne i(k+1) = a opt i(k) . Observation (b) ensures us that
Accordingly, we have that
The first and third equalities follow by rearranging the terms. The second equality can be shown using the definition of φ as in (18) ; the last equality follows by (20) . The inequality derives from the fact that a 0 = a ne optimizes the potential function. Thanks to observation (b), one can show that Q \Q = a ne i(1) \ a opt i(m) andQ \ Q = a opt i(m) \ a ne i (1) .
If Q \Q = ∅, it must be that a ne i(1) = a opt i(m) so that Q \Q = a ne i(1) andQ \ Q = a opt i(m) . Using a ne i(1) = a opt i(m) in condition (ii), tells us that a opt i(m) / ∈ a ne and thus the resource a opt i(m) is not chosen by anyone else in the allocation a m . Thus, when Q \Q = ∅,
When Q \Q = ∅, alsoQ \ Q = ∅ and thus the previous inequality still holds. Rearranging the terms and adding r∈Q∩Q v r f (|a ne | r ) to each side gives us
Finally note that
which together with (22) completes the proof.
Our second claim shows that there exist a collection of disjoint sequences that covers all players in N . We will express a sequence merely by the deviating player set I with the understanding that this set uniquely determines the sequence of allocations.
Claim. There exists a collection of deviating players I 1 , . . . , I p chosen according the process described above such that ∪ k I k = N and I j ∩ I k = ∅ for any j = k.
Proof. Suppose I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k represent the first k sequences of deviating players. Further assume that they are all disjoint. Choose some player i ∈ N \∪ k I k to start the (k +1)-th sequence. If no such player exists, we are done. Otherwise, construct the sequence according to the process depicted above. If the sequence terminates without selecting a player in ∪ k I k , then repeat this process to generate the (k + 2)-th sequence. Otherwise, let i k+1 (j), j ≥ 2, denote the first player in the (k + 1)-th sequence contained in the set ∪ k I k . Since a opt i = a opt j (for i = j), this player must be contained in the set ∪ k i k (1), i.e., the first player in a previous sequence. Suppose this player is i (1), where ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If this is the case, replace the -th sequence with {i k+1 (1), . . . , i k+1 (j − 1), I } which is a valid sequence and disjoint from the others. Then repeat the process above to choose the (k + 1)-th sequence. Note that this process can continue at most n-steps and will always result in a collection of disjoint sequences that cover all players in N . This completes the proof.
In the following we complete the proof of Theorem 3, by means of Claims A and A.
Proof. We being showing a lower bound on the price of stability. Let I 1 , . . . , I p denote a collection of deviating players that satisfies Claim A. Further, let Q k andQ k be defined as above for each sequence k = 1, . . . , p. Using the result (19) from Claim A, we have where the above equality follows from the fact thatQ i ∩Q j = ∅ for any i = j which is due to the disjointness of a opt . Using the definition of U i (a ne ), we have r∈a ne \a opt v r |a ne | r f (|a ne | r ) + r∈a ne ∩a opt v r (|a ne | r − 1) f (|a ne | r ) ≥ r∈a opt \a ne v r .
Define γ = max j≤n (j − 1)f (j). Working with the above expression we have r∈a ne \a opt v r (γ + 1) + r∈a ne ∩a opt v r γ ≥ r∈a opt \a ne v r , which gives us that (γ + 1)W (a ne ) ≥ W (a opt ) which completes the lower bound.
We will now provide an accompanying upper bound on the price of stability. To that end, consider a family of examples parameterized by a coefficient j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For each j, the game consists of j agents and (j + 1)-resources R = {r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r j } where the values of the resources are v r 0 = 1 and v r 1 = · · · = v r j = f (j) − ε where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant, and the action set of each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , j} is A i = {r 0 , r i }. The unique equilibrium is of the form a ne = (r 0 , . . . , r 0 ) as every agent selects resource r 0 and the total welfare is W (a ne ) = 1. The optimal allocation is of the form a opt = (r 0 , r 2 , . . . , r j ) which generates a total welfare of W (a opt ) = 1 + (j − 1)(f (j) − ε). Performing a worst case analysis over ε and j gives
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of PoS result We begin our proof with a lemma that identifies a structure about the state based distribution rule {f k i }.
Lemma 1. Let a be any allocation. Then for each agent i ∈ N , one of the following two statements is true.
-U i (a i = r, a −i ) = v r · f mc (|a −i | + 1), ∀a i ∈ A i ; or -U i (a i = r, a −i ) = v r · f gar (|a −i | + 1), ∀a i ∈ A i .
Informally, this lemma states that for a given allocation a, the state based distribution rule will either evaluate every resource at the marginal contribution distribution or every resource at the Gairing distribution rule for a given agent i.
Proof. Let a be any allocation and i be any agent. Extend the definition of x i (a) in (16) as
z i (a) = max
and note that x i (a) = max{y i (a), z i (a)}. First observe that for any a i ∈ A i : (i) y i (a) ≤ V i (a); (ii) z i (a) = z i (a i , a −i ); and (iii) V i (a) = V i (a i , a −i ). Accordingly, x i (a) > V i (a) if and only if x i (a) = z i (a). Consequently, x i (a) > V i (a) if and only if x i (a i , a −i ) > V i (a i , a −i ) which completes the proof.
